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Sprouse, Wagers, & Phillips (in press) carried out two experiments in which they measured
individual differences in memory to test processing accounts of island effects. They found that
these individual differences failed to predict the magnitude of island effects and construe these
findings as counterevidence to processing-based accounts of island effects. Here, we take up
several problems with their methods, their findings, and their conclusions.
First, the arguments against processing accounts are based on null results using tasks
that may be ineffective or inappropriate measures of working memory (the n-back and serial
recall tasks). The authors provide no evidence that these two measures predict judgments for
other constructions that are difficult to process and yet are clearly grammatical. They assume
that other measures of working memory would have yielded the same result, but provide no
justification that they should. We further show that whether a working memory measure
relates to judgments of grammatical, hard-to-process sentences depends on how difficult the
sentences are. In this light, the stimuli used by the authors present processing difficulties
other than the island violations under investigation and may have been particularly hard to
process. Second, the Sprouse et al. results are statistically in line with the hypothesis that
island sensitivity varies with working memory. Three out of the four island types in their
Experiment 1 show a significant relation between memory scores and island sensitivity, but
the authors discount these findings on the grounds that the variance accounted for is too small
to have much import. This interpretation, however, runs counter to standard practices in
linguistics, psycholinguistics, and psychology.∗
Acceptability judgments are inherently ambiguous. Judging a sentence’s acceptability poten-
tially involves the assessment of its syntactic well-formedness, the online processing difficulty en-
countered while parsing it, as well as other factors (Chomsky & Miller, 1963; Miller & Chomsky,
1963; Bever, 1970; Schu¨tze, 1996; Cowart, 1997; Staum Casasanto et al., 2010; Hofmeister et al.,
in press). Hence, it is unsurprising that there is disagreement about the explanation for some
acceptability contrasts. It is even less surprising when one considers that there are no agreed
upon diagnostics distinguishing grammatically-based acceptability contrasts from those based on
processing cost.
Sprouse et al. (in press; hereafter, SWP) suggest that the relationship between measures of
working memory and acceptability judgments may be one such diagnostic. They attempt to use it
to resolve a long-standing debate regarding the source of island effects. The term “island effects”
here refers to the low acceptability ratings given to sentences with a dependency between a phrase
and a syntactic position inside select syntactic environments. For instance, the wh-element, what,
in (1) is linked to an argument position inside a complex noun phrase (in brackets):
(1) What did Jim repeat [the rumor that Spock loved ]?
Ross (1967) lists an array of such syntactic environments that block dependency formation. Since
that time, the associated island constraints have been entrenched in linguistic theory as instances
of universal grammatical principles and have acted as standard tests for overt and covert phrasal
movement (Chomsky, 1973, 1977, 1981, 1986).
Numerous researchers, however, have noted that island violations often co-occur with features
known to produce processing difficulty (Kuno, 1973; Deane, 1991; Kluender, 1991, 1998, 2005; Klu-
ender & Kutas, 1993; Hofmeister, 2007; Hofmeister et al., 2007; Sag et al., 2007; Hofmeister & Sag,
2010), such as long-distance dependencies spanning multiple new discourse referents, opportunities
for garden-pathing or misanalysis, syntactically and semantically similar discourse referents, vague
or non-specific filler phrases, etc. For instance, the dependency in (1) not only spans multiple
discourse references, but the parser is likely to attempt to integrate the wh-item at the first verb
(repeat), leading to reanalysis when the subsequent NP is encountered, or even later. Notably,
the island violation is less severe when what is replaced with who, which is explainable on the hy-
pothesis that who is not a particularly plausible argument of repeat. These facts, and others like
them, motivate the alternative hypothesis that island effects follow from the increase in processing
difficulty that such constructions engender directly and typically co-occur with in examples found
in the literature.
SWP set out to evaluate such a processing-based theory of islands, what they label a “reduction-
ist” account1, by examining how individual differences in processing resources relate to acceptability
judgments. The intuition at play is a reasonable one: if judgments of island-violating sentences re-
flect processing limitations, then individuals with more processing resources should be less likely to
“run out” of resources while processing a sentence with an island violation. The acceptability con-
trast between island-violating and minimally different, non-violating sentences should accordingly
be smaller for such individuals than it is for those with fewer language processing resources.
To assess the relationship between individual working memory (WM) resources and island sen-
sitivity, SWP calculated differences-in-differences (DD) scores for each participant. These scores
are calculated by first subtracting a participant’s mean acceptability judgment for sentences with
a dependency into an island (2b) from their mean judgment for sentences with a dependency into
an embedded, non-island structure (2a). This difference is termed D1. Next, the participant’s
mean judgment for sentences with an island structure but which the wh-dependency does not enter
(2d) is subtracted from the mean for sentences with an embedded non-island constituent and a wh-
dependency that does not enter into the constituent (2c). This difference, termed D2, is subtracted
from D1 to yield the overall DD score.
(2) a. What do you think that John bought?
b. What do you wonder whether John bought?
c. Who thinks that John bought a car?
d. Who wonders whether John bought a car?
In essence, these scores reflect “how much greater the effect of an island structure is in a long-distance
dependency sentence than in a sentence with a local dependency” (Sprouse et al., in press). The
main findings from SWP show that how respondents performed on the memory assessment tasks
accounted for only 0-6% of the overall variance in the magnitude of island effects (DD scores).
The authors interpret these facts, whose statistical reliability is well-established, as counter to the
predictions of a processing-based perspective of island effects.
There are several notable obstacles, however, that stand in the way of interpreting the results
as the authors do, which we briefly summarize below:
The Relationship Between Individual Working Memory Measures and Acceptability Judgments
i. The null results leave open the possibility that the authors have selected an inappropriate
WM measure, as the authors acknowledge;
ii. There is no extant data on how the chosen memory measures relate to acceptability judgments
for uncontroversially hard-to-process sentences of English;
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Interpretation of Goodness-of-Fit Statistics (R2)
The authors assume that resource limitation theories must account for some arbitrarily large
amount of overall variance above that found in their studies. Because that threshold is not
reached, they interpret as “not particularly meaningful” the fact that 3 out of the 4 island
types in their Experiment 1 (in the data of participants who show island effects at all) exhibit
a statistically significant relationship between their memory measures and island sensitivity,
as predicted by a resource limitation theory.
We will discuss both of these issues in turn.
To assess working memory, SWP use two different measures: the n-back task and the serial
recall task. In the n-back task, participants see sequences of letters or pictures and must answer
whether the current stimulus matches with the stimulus seen n turns before. SWP’s version of
the serial recall task asks participants to recite back the same 8 words in the precise order in
which they were presented, using a total of 10 different orderings. Besides these two simple span
tests (simple because there is no secondary task involved), there exist numerous other measures of
working memory, including complex memory span tasks, which require participants to store stimuli
while performing a highly distracting secondary task (Daneman & Carpenter, 1980). For instance,
in the reading span task, participants read a series of sentences and must store and eventually recite
the final word from each sentence following the final sentence in the sequence. This task has been
used by numerous researchers in investigations of linguistic processing and performance on the task
is highly predictive of reading and listening comprehension skill, as well as general fluid intelligence
(Daneman & Carpenter, 1980; King & Just, 1991; Whitney et al., 1991; Just & Carpenter, 1992;
Daneman & Merikle, 1996; Whitney et al., 2001; Friedman & Miyake, 2004, inter alia).
Clearly, the validity of the SWP findings hinges on the choice of WM measure. SWP explicitly
acknowledge that “it is logically possible that a different capacity measure could be found that does
indeed correlate with the acceptability of island effects” but counter that “many working memory
measures share common variance” and similarly that “there is a large component of shared variance
between simple span tasks and complex span tasks”, citing Conway, Kane, Bunting, Hambrick,
Wilhelm, & Engle (2005). They subsequently cite evidence from Kane et al. (2007) that the n-back
and serial recall task results are uncorrelated, and take this to mean that “the likelihood of finding
a new measure that correlates with neither is very small indeed.” They conclude that the choice of
another WM task is unlikely to change the results, even if the task was a complex span task: “The
two tasks we have chosen jointly correlate with most other popular WM tasks . . . this does not
eliminate the possibility that we did not test the correct component of the working memory system.
However it does substantially decrease the likelihood of this error, as it is highly unlikely that any
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other extant working memory task would yield results that are significantly different than the results
of the two tasks employed here.” They assume, therefore, that a different memory measure would
be highly likely to correlate with either the results from the n-back or serial recall task, and hence
produce similar findings.
There are several problems with this reasoning. First, Conway et al. (2005) only show that scores
from three complex span tasks are highly correlated: reading span, counting span, and operation
span tasks. None of these WM tasks are used by SWP. In fact, there is reason to question whether
the n-back and serial recall tasks should be considered WM tasks at all as they do not involve a
secondary processing task. Kane et al. (2004, p. 190), for instance, treat such simple span tasks
as measures of short-term memory, rather than working memory tasks, noting that complex span
tasks like the reading span have “strongly predicted comprehension abilities in ways that simple
short-term memory (STM) storage tasks did not”. Similarly, in their only mention of n-back
tasks, Conway et al. (2005, pp. 780-1) note that n-back tasks “present quite different cognitive
demands” from complex span tasks and that “the n-back task may be a more appropriate indicator
of the construct measured by STMC [short term memory capacity], rather than by WMC [working
memory capacity] tasks”. Conway et al. (2005, p. 780) also observe that correlations between
the three above-mentioned complex span tasks range from .40 to .60, “suggesting that they are
indeed tapping some common process or ability but also suggesting that they are not identical.”
So even for these “highly correlated” complex span tasks, one cannot presume that identical or
even qualitatively similar results would necessarily follow from substituting one task for the other.
Consequently, it does not follow that the choice of some alternative WM measure would yield
identical or even highly similar results.
This is a critical issue, illustrated by the following example. Assume that the amount a person
smokes (inversely) correlates with the amount of time they exercise on a weekly basis, but that time
spent exercising fails to correlate strongly with dental hygiene. It would be imprudent to conclude
that because smoking rates and exercise are correlated, that smoking habits will similarly fail to
show a strong relationship to dental hygiene. Generally speaking, even if there are significant cor-
relations between WM measures, one cannot strongly conclude that they will produce qualitatively
similar results with a given task: it depends on what aspect of cognition (e.g. attention, inhibi-
tion of distractors, strategic encoding, etc.) they commonly capture, on what aspects they capture
independently, and on what aspects of cognition the critical task itself taps.
A final note on SWP’s choice of memory measures: the argument they present is essentially
that the combination of the n-back task and serial recall task captures every relevant component or
aspect of WM. Although it is true that simple span tasks like the n-back and serial recall task share
common variance with multiple other memory tasks, including some complex span tasks, it does
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not follow that these two tasks are sufficient by themselves to capture all components of variance in
tasks that recruit WM resources. A central point of Kane et al. (2004) is that, even though simple
span tasks and complex span tasks share substantial variance with each other, they are nevertheless
“separable”, differing in their ability to tap domain-general cognitive processes and their ability
to predict general fluid intelligence. In other words, the two simple span tasks chosen by SWP
are ultimately distinct from other memory measures, even if they tap some common properties.
Indeed, memory researchers would be well-advised to abandon all other memory measures if these
two were sufficient by themselves to account for all differences in verbal working memory. We
therefore consider it improbable that these two combined memory measures alone capture any and
all variation due to differences in working memory resources.
Beyond this issue, SWP’s conclusions depend upon a critical assumption about how WM mea-
sures generally relate to acceptability judgments. Specifically, they assume that their WM measures
can predict ratings for sentences that impose varying degrees of processing difficulty: respondents
with more resources, as measured by the n-back and serial recall tasks, should show less sensitivity
to manipulations of processing difficulty. While plausible in theory, there is no evidence that scores
from the n-back and serial recall tasks strongly correlate with judgments for any sentences with
clear processing difficulty, let alone with the sources of processing difficulty that processing-based
accounts attribute to island structures. In other words, they may have chosen WM measures that
do not actually correlate with processing-based acceptability decrements for any type of sentence
structure. If judgments for sentences with varying degrees of uncontroversial processing difficulty
show no relationship to WM scores, then there is little reason to suspect that judgments for sen-
tences containing island violations would either. Moreover, even if their measures correlated with
judgments on some hard-to-process constructions, not all types and degrees of processing difficulty
will necessarily show the same relationship to measures of memory, particularly if not all sources of
sentence processing difficulty are memory-related.
Is this merely a theoretical obstacle, or is there reason to doubt the assumed correlation between
judgments for sentences of high difficulty and individual WM measures? In a series of recent
experiments, Hofmeister et al. (to appear) examine how acceptability judgments for sentences with
varying degrees of processing difficulty relate to individual assessments of working memory. WM
capacity was assessed by a reading span task along the lines of that described in Daneman &
Carpenter (1980).
In one of these studies, the critical items varied in terms of two factors known to affect processing
difficulty: dependency length and relative clause type (subject- vs. object relative clause). Research
by Gibson & colleagues has established that increased dependency length increases processing dif-
ficulty, due to storage of syntactic predictions and retrieval costs (Chen et al., 2005; Gibson, 1998,
6




























































































Figure 1: Linear estimates of the relationship between reading span and acceptability z-scores for
sentence types with varying degrees of difficulty. Dotted lines show 95% confidence intervals.
2000; Grodner & Gibson, 2005). Object relative clauses are also well-known to impose more pro-
cessing difficulty than subject relative clauses (King & Just, 1991; Just & Carpenter, 1992; King &
Kutas, 1995). An example item is shown below:
(3) a. Someone figured out which politician wrote that Robert bribed a reporter that trusted
Nancy without thinking about it. [short-src]
b. Someone figured out which politician wrote that Robert bribed a reporter that Nancy
trusted without thinking about it. [short-orc]
c. Someone figured out which politician a reporter that trusted Nancy wrote that Robert
bribed without thinking about it. [long-src]
d. Someone figured out which politician a reporter that Nancy trusted wrote that Robert
bribed without thinking about it. [long-orc]
As Figure 1 depicts, higher scores on the reading span task are associated with higher acceptability
z-scores in the two relatively easy conditions with short dependencies, (3a) & (3b). But in the
difficult conditions with long dependencies, (3c) & (3d), there is no evidence of a relationship
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between span scores and judgments. This pattern accounts for the significant interaction between
WM and dependency length in the linear mixed effects model of acceptability judgments (see
Hofmeister et al. (to appear) for details). In addition, the R2 between z-score and reading span
score in the conditions with long dependencies (or high processing difficulty) is just .012. Individual
cognitive differences thus account for little variation in judgments, despite the clear fact that it is
the processing difficulty of these items that yields the low acceptability ratings.
What this demonstrates is that the relationship between acceptability judgments and at least
some measures of WM is not straightforward. Some sentences may be so hard to process that
even individuals with high spans experience a resource shortfall or processing breakdown. How-
ever, sentences with mild to moderate processing difficulty leave room for individual differences
to emerge in the acceptability ratings (for further evidence of this, see Staum Casasanto et al.
(2010)). The point here is not that the reading span task necessarily taps the resources relevant
for island processing. Rather, increased processing resources, as measured by span tasks, does not
uniformly decrease sensitivity to difficulty manipulations across all sentence types. The same WM
measure can be shown to relate to variation in judgments for some sentence types, but not others,
particularly when these latter sentences are extremely hard to process. Thus, if islands represent
extreme cases of processing difficulty (the central claim being made by processing-based accounts),
individual WM differences may be irrelevant for judgments of acceptability.
This point is particularly relevant given the nature of the stimuli used by SWP. For the critical
items,2 the sentence structures had confounding sources of difficulty beyond the island structure
itself. A representative island-violating stimulus is What do you wonder whether John bought? This
is a decontextualized direct question with an odd pragmatic import, i.e. it is difficult to imagine
why someone would ever ask this question, it has a vague wh-filler, a referential NP (John) with no
discourse antecedent, and an opportunity for misanalysis at the verb wonder where the parser may
strategically attempt to integrate the wh-filler, leading to a potentially costly reanalysis phase at
the next word. According to the item lists, all experimental items contained similar hindrances to
processing. Consider, by contrast, the much more natural attested examples of wh-island violations
from the internet:
(i) While there are many beneficial aspects to child adoption, there are a number of disadvantages
that you should consider and decide whether you are comfortable with before committing time,
energy and resources to the process.3
ii) Insul-knife is one of those time-saving tools that you will wonder how you ever lived without.4
Note that in the attested examples, the only references to individuals between the filler and its
gap site are made with the high accessibility-marking second person pronoun you. Moreover, these
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real life examples do not pose pragmatically odd questions with non-specific wh-words. One of the
primary points of Hofmeister & Sag (2010), in this regard, is that prior research on island effects
has not systematically controlled for factors affecting acceptability that are orthogonal to the island
structure, i.e. many prior examples in the literature have features besides the island structure that
lower acceptability judgments. The unnecessary complexity of their items may thus be yet another
factor in the null results of SWP. This point highlights the danger of drawing strong conclusions on
the basis of null results: even if the experiment has sufficient statistical power to find an effect, the
null results may plausibly stem from design features in the materials.
To establish that individual WM differences truly matter for judgments of island violations, we
need a measure that shows a reliable relationship to judgments for sentences with uncontroversial
difficulty of the appropriate sort. In the case of island violating sentences, Hofmeister & Sag (2010)
point to a number of distinct, complicating factors in the processing of islands. It is not any of
these factors alone that produces island effects, but the simultaneous pressure of multiple processing
demands, as in the case of Complex Noun Phrase Constraint violations:
“. . . a dependency into a complex noun phrase in English requires processing at least
three nominal references inside the dependency and crossing a clause boundary:
(46) Which politician did you1 read reports2 that we3 had impeached?
Added to this, a syntactic ambiguity arises after processing reports that. At this point,
both a sentential complement and a relative clause parse (as in Which politician did
you read reports [RC that we had written] in front of?) are theoretically possible. Even
if one parse is more likely from a top-down perspective, these parses may nevertheless
compete with one another”
Accordingly, to know whether a given WM measure should predict sensitivity to CNPC viola-
tions, it would be necessary to look at uncontroversial examples that have similar features. Garden-
path sentences, for instance, are characterized by the high potential for misanalysis. Theoretically,
combining such constructions with multiple discourse references would yield examples that resemble
CNPC constructions. If judgments for garden path sentences with high reference processing costs
(and even better, a clause boundary) fail to show any relationship to performance on WM tasks,
there is little reason to suspect something different for island-related judgments. Indeed, Waters
& Caplan (1996) tested how high-, medium-, and low-span participants judged the acceptability
of various garden path sentences under whole-sentence visual presentation or rapid serial visual
presentation in a forced-choice (“good” or “bad”) task. All groups responded more slowly and less
accurately to garden path sentences, compared to non-garden path sentences. However, the mag-
nitude of these differences did not vary across the groups. This provides cautionary evidence that
9
standard measures of WM may not adequately capture differences in the processing and judging
of garden path sentences, and to the extent that some island types share similar features, these
measures may be similarly limited in the domain of island effects.
The second major obstacle to interpreting the SWP findings as the authors do relates to their
reliance on R2 values as a means of hypothesis testing, rather than p-values. In their first experiment,
SWP find a significant negative linear relationship (p < .05) between DD scores for 3 out of the 4
island types and the participants’ WM estimates for the subset of participants with positive DD
scores. That is, these participants (more than 80% of the total sample in Experiment 1) found that
the negative (acceptability-lowering) effect of an island structure (e.g. a wh-island) on judgments
was greater when a dependency entered into it than when the dependency did not. Among these
participants, the effect of islandhood was significantly weaker for individuals with higher spans.
This evidence, however, is not taken as support for a processing-based theory, or a refutation of
a grammar-based theory. Rather, SWP conclude that, “because the goodness-of-fit of the lines is
so low, these results are not particularly meaningful.” That is, because the WM estimates only
account for a small amount of variance, the fact that t-tests indicate the statistical significance of
the linear fit does not constitute good evidence for a processing-based account of islands.
This argument critically assumes that a theory can be proved or disproved on the basis of how
much overall variance it accounts for. In this respect, SWP say that
“[u]nlike p-values, there are no broadly agreed-upon conventions for interpreting R2
values; however, it is safe to assume that the extremely small R2 values found for each
of the island types (even after removing potentially noisy DD scores) are not at all what
one would predict under a theory like the resource-limitation theory, which relies heavily
on a single factor for its explanatory power.”
Again, there are numerous reasons to question this interpretation of the results.
First, WM estimates may account for little overall variance, even in situations where processing
difficulty clearly plays an integral role in judgment patterns. This is evident from the Hofmeister
et al. (to appear) experiment described above, as well as the Waters & Caplan (1996) results. Pro-
cessing difficulty is clearly the reason why examples like (3c) & (3d) are judged to be unacceptable,
yet the measure of WM – the reading span — fails to show any relationship to the corresponding
judgments.
Second, while some experimental manipulations in psycholinguistic studies may account for
a large amount of variance, this is by no means standard and does not act as a benchmark for
reporting significance in any linguistics, psycholinguistics, or psychology journal. Often, the lion’s
share of variance in acceptability and psycholinguistic studies can be attributed to differences in
participants and items, not the manipulation of interest.
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Third, the reasoning in the passage cited above assumes that the memory measures they have
chosen adequately capture variation in resource limitations, particularly as they apply to the pro-
cessing of island structures. But as we have already seen, there is no evidence that the n-back and
serial recall task scores correlate with judgments for any hard-to-process sentence structures in En-
glish. The low R2 values could thus reflect the fact that the two memory tasks only weakly overlap
with the processing of island violations in terms of cognitive resources and processes. In general,
no WM measure has been claimed to perfectly capture differences in verbal working memory, so
any R2 for the amount of overall variance of acceptability scores explained by a WM measure will
be based on imperfect snapshots of the participants.
Fourth and most importantly, no matter what the accompanying R2 value is, there are no
established grounds in the scientific community for claiming that statistically significant tests lack
meaning. Their meaning is, in fact, unambiguous: the predictors of interest have a statistically
reliable impact on the dependent variable at the α-level of .05 used in these studies, i.e. there is a
probability of .05 or less that the finding of significance is spurious. SWP’s conclusions, therefore,
depend on post hoc assumptions about how to interpret R2 values and the puzzling assertion
that some statistically significant effects are not meaningful. Indeed, on the standard method of
hypothesis testing (using p-values rather than R2 values as the arbiter of statistical significance),
the SWP results argue, if anything, in favor of a processing-based account.
The absence of clear insights into how WM differences relate to acceptability judgments therefore
makes it difficult, if not impossible, to draw meaningful conclusions from the SWP findings. We
have suggested several reasons why no relationship between these variables is evident in the case
of island-violating structures. First, the null effects established with the use of the n-back and
serial recall tasks may be dependent upon the use of those memory measures. The arguments
adduced in favor of their adequacy rely on the unwarranted assumption that correlated measures
of memory will return qualitatively similar results. Furthermore, for any measure that we wish to
use to draw conclusions about grammar vs. processing, there needs to be some precedent showing
that differences in this measure can predict variation in judgments for sentences of the appropriate
processing difficulty. We have shown that for at least one measure (reading span), performance
on the task only correlates with judgments for items which are moderately difficult; it does not
correlate with items whose reduced acceptability is attributable to extreme processing difficulty.
Third, the very evidence which SWP present is at least partially in line with the hypothesis that
island sensitivity will vary with individual differences in resource limitations (as measured by the
n-back and serial recall tasks).
In sum, we agree that finding diagnostics for separating the effects of grammatical and process-
ing constraints on acceptability judgments is a necessary and worthwhile enterprise in linguistics.
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However, in order to support inferences about controversial cases, these diagnostics must be val-
idated in terms of cases where little controversy exists. Only once this is done can we begin to
properly understand how grammar and processing differ in their effects on acceptability judgments.
Notes
∗For stimulating feedback and discussion of the ideas presented here, we thank Daniel Casasanto,
Herb Clark, Ted Gibson, and Tom Wasow. The usual provisos apply.
1The term “reductionist” suggests a perspective where a complex phenomenon is simplified to
the point of minimizing it or missing important details. Accordingly, we opt for more neutral terms
like “processing-based accounts” or “emergent accounts” of island effects.
2Items are available at http://www.socsci.uci.edu/ jsprouse/
3http://www.ehow.com/info 7854078 disadvantages-child-adoption.html accessed 20 March 2012
4http://www.cepcotool.com/insulknife/ accessed 30 Dec 2011
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